We are living interesting times in terms of macroeconomic policy: the world faces big shocks and substantial challenges, and many current circumstances have no historical precedents. This means that policy makers cannot draw from experience and need to invent new policies from somewhere better than their guts. And after a few hesitations, theory is now in much better shape to answer questions from policy makers. For example, what should one do when there is a liquidity trap in a globalized economy, especially if the trap itself is globalized?
David Cook and Michael Devereux show how, and it borders on a political miracle. Not only does one need to get the cooperation of fiscal and monetary authorities (something the US is not close to achieving) but one needs the cooperation across countries even if it entails some costs to the "winners" (something the Chinese have so far refused and the Swiss recently abandoned).
Specifically, Cook and Devereux show that with so many countries currently with negative real interest rates, we have a worldwide liquidity trap. In an open economy, the policy prescription differs from a closed economy. If there is a negative demand shock, fiscal policy needs of course to raise aggregate demand, but with a global economy, this can come from anywhere in the world and thus a coordinated fiscal policy is due. But to channel the impulse to the relevant countries, monetary policy coordination is necessary to raise interest rates in the foreign countries, even if they are in a liquidity trap. And this takes some serious courage. One can always dream.
Showing posts with label international markets. Show all posts
Showing posts with label international markets. Show all posts
Monday, October 3, 2011
Monday, August 8, 2011
What if the US looses its reserve currency privilege?
Since the Bretton Woods agreement in 1945, the United States have enjoyed the so-called "Exhorbitant Privilege." During the fixed exchange rate regime, the US could conduct monetary policy without regard to what was happening in other countries. The US dollar was a reserve currency, which also helped the US maintain low interest rates and a guarantee that US dollars (and Treasury bonds) would always find a buyer. With flexible exchange rates, not much has changed. But with the recent shenanigans in a Congress that considered reneging on its debt, the likelihood of this advantage changing has dramatically increased. What would the consequences of the loss of the Exhorbitant Privilege be?
Wenli Cheng and Dingsheng Zhang study this scenario using a general equilibrium model where a peripheral country (say, the Asian economies) pegs its currency to the money of a central country (say, the United States), the latter being used as the vehicle currency for international trade. In addition, the foreign exchange reserves of the periphery are invested in government bonds of the center. This means that no matter what current account deficit of the center, it is always financed by the periphery. Yet the center may be tempted to inflate it away. This limitless and to some extend free borrowing is the Exhorbitant Privilege.
Now remove it by assuming that the periphery does not want to invest in the center, either because it views the Treasury bonds are excessively risky or because it does not peg to the dollar any more. This would lead to a dramatic readjustment of the terms of trade to favor the tradable sector of the center. This decpraciation of the dollar would be more pronounced of the center is incapable of raising taxes and finances its debt with inflation. This already all sounds familiar.
Wenli Cheng and Dingsheng Zhang study this scenario using a general equilibrium model where a peripheral country (say, the Asian economies) pegs its currency to the money of a central country (say, the United States), the latter being used as the vehicle currency for international trade. In addition, the foreign exchange reserves of the periphery are invested in government bonds of the center. This means that no matter what current account deficit of the center, it is always financed by the periphery. Yet the center may be tempted to inflate it away. This limitless and to some extend free borrowing is the Exhorbitant Privilege.
Now remove it by assuming that the periphery does not want to invest in the center, either because it views the Treasury bonds are excessively risky or because it does not peg to the dollar any more. This would lead to a dramatic readjustment of the terms of trade to favor the tradable sector of the center. This decpraciation of the dollar would be more pronounced of the center is incapable of raising taxes and finances its debt with inflation. This already all sounds familiar.
Tuesday, July 26, 2011
Trade constraints of developing countries
With all the current posturing in the US and Europe, while addressing doubtlessly important problems, it is easy to forget that there are much bigger issues that need to be solved: how to get the poor and especially the poorest economies to a decent standard of living. We have been blessed to be born in the right families and in the right countries, and we should share this luck with those who were no so fortunate. This does not necessarily mean to give to the poor, just giving them a fair chance may be enough.
Jean-Jacques Hallaert, Ricardo Cavazos Cepeda and Gimin Kang consider the consequences of trade barriers on developing economies. The latter should be able to benefit greatly from selling on world markets goods produced with the factor they are relatively rich of, unskilled labor and to some extend land, while importing the complementary goods, likely capital-intensive investment goods. This OECD study finds that developed economies cannot do much more in terms of reducing import tariffs. Where there is more potential is with home-grown issues: unreliability of electricity, high transportation costs, poor education, bad governance, and instability. These results have been obtained by regressing exports, imports or their sum on a number of indicator for a panel of data. I am not particularly keen on these exercises due to poor data quality, gigantic endogeneity and especially the fact that proxies for essentially unquantifiable variables are used, like property rights and governance. But I suppose this is the best one can do, and the results appear to be rather stark. Now as to how to solve these economic problems, that is a gigantic task that we should be really talking about these days, instead of posturing for political gain.
Jean-Jacques Hallaert, Ricardo Cavazos Cepeda and Gimin Kang consider the consequences of trade barriers on developing economies. The latter should be able to benefit greatly from selling on world markets goods produced with the factor they are relatively rich of, unskilled labor and to some extend land, while importing the complementary goods, likely capital-intensive investment goods. This OECD study finds that developed economies cannot do much more in terms of reducing import tariffs. Where there is more potential is with home-grown issues: unreliability of electricity, high transportation costs, poor education, bad governance, and instability. These results have been obtained by regressing exports, imports or their sum on a number of indicator for a panel of data. I am not particularly keen on these exercises due to poor data quality, gigantic endogeneity and especially the fact that proxies for essentially unquantifiable variables are used, like property rights and governance. But I suppose this is the best one can do, and the results appear to be rather stark. Now as to how to solve these economic problems, that is a gigantic task that we should be really talking about these days, instead of posturing for political gain.
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