In difficult times, it is easy to blame central banks for everything. Part of their role, after all, is to play the scape goat for policies the politician do not dare implementing. But then, there is only so much the central banks can do, as Europe and the United States no "nicely" show now. A substantial ingredient in the blame game is a call for a return to the gold standard, a nostalgia for supposedly better and easier times.
Olivier Ledoit and Sébastien Lotz echo this call and study what our current understanding is about the coexistence of fiat and commodity money. In principle, we can start from the idea that currency competition is good: this would force the central bank to be more careful with its fiat money. Indeed, we have learned from money search theory that bad money does not necessarily chase good money (the old Gresham's Law). Also, if the commodity has a positive return, its monetization is beneficial as long as its storage and transaction cost is sufficiently low. The question is then on how to find a commodity that has a real return from just sitting there. There is a larger problem, though, with small denominations. How do you mint coins measured in cents when the commodity is, for example, gold? Either the coins need to be very small or they have very small commodity content, to the point that they become ... fiat money. Monetary policy also becomes tricky, as quite obviously temporary easing becomes difficult if it risks driving fiat money out.
But in the end, isn't a commodity like gold only valuable because people believe it is valuable? Gold, to take an extreme and popular case, has little intrinsic value, as I argued before, and is thus just another fiat currency. It is all a question of perception.
Showing posts with label money. Show all posts
Showing posts with label money. Show all posts
Tuesday, October 4, 2011
Friday, August 26, 2011
Was medieval seigniorage welfare improving?
The presence of coins improves social welfare, as it allows for more trades than barter would allow. Coin minting also provides income to the minting authority, as it can buy stuff with coins that have more value than their production cost. This is called seigniorage. This was also the case in medieval times, where "seigneurs" would mint gold or silver coins with somewhat less metal content than indicated and thus get income. One would thus think that these minters would be profit maximizing, and thus enhance welfare only as a by-product.
Angela Redish and Warren Weber say this is not quite true. They build a random matching model of commodity money, where the supply of silver is exogenous. They derive the welfare maximizing size and quantity of coins as a function of the quantity of silver and the probability of acceptance of cash. Using data from medieval Venice and England, they find that the model predictions follow remarkably well the historical record. This probably means that authorities were benevolent. I say probably because they may have acted in the same way out of selfishness, but that is not documented in the paper. Indeed, the model assumes than any holder of silver can mint, while in reality a limited number of people could do that.
Angela Redish and Warren Weber say this is not quite true. They build a random matching model of commodity money, where the supply of silver is exogenous. They derive the welfare maximizing size and quantity of coins as a function of the quantity of silver and the probability of acceptance of cash. Using data from medieval Venice and England, they find that the model predictions follow remarkably well the historical record. This probably means that authorities were benevolent. I say probably because they may have acted in the same way out of selfishness, but that is not documented in the paper. Indeed, the model assumes than any holder of silver can mint, while in reality a limited number of people could do that.
Friday, August 19, 2011
Trust in private money
Money does not have to be supplied by government. Private money could work under some circumstances, and it has in particular been argued that competition should be beneficial. While previous attempts have failed, the wider availability of information, rating agencies (gasp) and information technology could make it happen. So it is of interest to find out what those circumstances are.
Ramon Marimon, Juan Pablo Nicolini and Pedro Teles say that money is an experience good, as you only observes its quality after the exchange is performed. This leads to serious limitations. If issuer of currency cannot commit to not inflate in the future, then competition over currency in the present has no bite. Building a reputation can solve this to some degree, but building the necessary trust means that future rewards must be larger that immediate gains from inflating. That implies that full efficiency cannot be attained: inflation needs to remain positive, while full efficiency implies negative inflation so that money has the same return as a risk-free bond. Unfortunately it also implies that there is indeterminacy and any inflation rate could happen. Oh well, may be the government could step in to help achieve efficiency...
Ramon Marimon, Juan Pablo Nicolini and Pedro Teles say that money is an experience good, as you only observes its quality after the exchange is performed. This leads to serious limitations. If issuer of currency cannot commit to not inflate in the future, then competition over currency in the present has no bite. Building a reputation can solve this to some degree, but building the necessary trust means that future rewards must be larger that immediate gains from inflating. That implies that full efficiency cannot be attained: inflation needs to remain positive, while full efficiency implies negative inflation so that money has the same return as a risk-free bond. Unfortunately it also implies that there is indeterminacy and any inflation rate could happen. Oh well, may be the government could step in to help achieve efficiency...
Monday, August 8, 2011
What if the US looses its reserve currency privilege?
Since the Bretton Woods agreement in 1945, the United States have enjoyed the so-called "Exhorbitant Privilege." During the fixed exchange rate regime, the US could conduct monetary policy without regard to what was happening in other countries. The US dollar was a reserve currency, which also helped the US maintain low interest rates and a guarantee that US dollars (and Treasury bonds) would always find a buyer. With flexible exchange rates, not much has changed. But with the recent shenanigans in a Congress that considered reneging on its debt, the likelihood of this advantage changing has dramatically increased. What would the consequences of the loss of the Exhorbitant Privilege be?
Wenli Cheng and Dingsheng Zhang study this scenario using a general equilibrium model where a peripheral country (say, the Asian economies) pegs its currency to the money of a central country (say, the United States), the latter being used as the vehicle currency for international trade. In addition, the foreign exchange reserves of the periphery are invested in government bonds of the center. This means that no matter what current account deficit of the center, it is always financed by the periphery. Yet the center may be tempted to inflate it away. This limitless and to some extend free borrowing is the Exhorbitant Privilege.
Now remove it by assuming that the periphery does not want to invest in the center, either because it views the Treasury bonds are excessively risky or because it does not peg to the dollar any more. This would lead to a dramatic readjustment of the terms of trade to favor the tradable sector of the center. This decpraciation of the dollar would be more pronounced of the center is incapable of raising taxes and finances its debt with inflation. This already all sounds familiar.
Wenli Cheng and Dingsheng Zhang study this scenario using a general equilibrium model where a peripheral country (say, the Asian economies) pegs its currency to the money of a central country (say, the United States), the latter being used as the vehicle currency for international trade. In addition, the foreign exchange reserves of the periphery are invested in government bonds of the center. This means that no matter what current account deficit of the center, it is always financed by the periphery. Yet the center may be tempted to inflate it away. This limitless and to some extend free borrowing is the Exhorbitant Privilege.
Now remove it by assuming that the periphery does not want to invest in the center, either because it views the Treasury bonds are excessively risky or because it does not peg to the dollar any more. This would lead to a dramatic readjustment of the terms of trade to favor the tradable sector of the center. This decpraciation of the dollar would be more pronounced of the center is incapable of raising taxes and finances its debt with inflation. This already all sounds familiar.
Wednesday, July 13, 2011
The welfare gain from inflation targeting
It is rather well accepted that transparency is preferred for policy, because it anchors better expectations, people generally do not like uncertainty, and discretion can lead to adverse biases compared to set policy rules. Yet, the United States exhibit little transparancy, with the Federal Reserve being one of the few western central banks not to declare some explicit policy target, and fiscal policy being as uncertain as ever. That would not be a big deal if the welfare costs were low, but you can think that there are high and in the case of fiscal policy are currenctly holding back the recovery.
Giorgio Di Giorgio and Guido Traficante are taking a closer look at the welfare benefits of inflation targeting. For this they use a model where households observe policy interest rates and do not know whether their changes are due to reactions to output gaps or shocks to the inflation target. Households are sophisticated, they use a signal extraction device to estimate the latent, unobservable variable. Yet, they still face substantial costs from the uncertainty. Money is not neutral because of Rotemberg pricing, a variant of Calvo pricing. Oh well, I guess this is what you need to do to get a result with some bite.
Households know there is a policy rule that determines the interest rate from the output gap (unobservable) and the inflation target (stochastic and persistent) as well as known preference and cost-push shocks. In other words, households know a lot about the structure of the economy and the shocks, except for the policy shock, but then somehow cannot figure out what the output gap is. The central bank can, though, but then has for obscure reasons a trembling hand when it comes to set its inflation target. That seems to be quite the opposite of what I would have thought: everyone is confused about the output gap, and only the central bank knows what the inflation target is. Instead of a story of households trying to disentangle output gap and inflation target from the interest rate signal, one would have a story of a central banker not quite sure what to do given the circumstances. Too bad, this could have been an interesting paper.
Giorgio Di Giorgio and Guido Traficante are taking a closer look at the welfare benefits of inflation targeting. For this they use a model where households observe policy interest rates and do not know whether their changes are due to reactions to output gaps or shocks to the inflation target. Households are sophisticated, they use a signal extraction device to estimate the latent, unobservable variable. Yet, they still face substantial costs from the uncertainty. Money is not neutral because of Rotemberg pricing, a variant of Calvo pricing. Oh well, I guess this is what you need to do to get a result with some bite.
Households know there is a policy rule that determines the interest rate from the output gap (unobservable) and the inflation target (stochastic and persistent) as well as known preference and cost-push shocks. In other words, households know a lot about the structure of the economy and the shocks, except for the policy shock, but then somehow cannot figure out what the output gap is. The central bank can, though, but then has for obscure reasons a trembling hand when it comes to set its inflation target. That seems to be quite the opposite of what I would have thought: everyone is confused about the output gap, and only the central bank knows what the inflation target is. Instead of a story of households trying to disentangle output gap and inflation target from the interest rate signal, one would have a story of a central banker not quite sure what to do given the circumstances. Too bad, this could have been an interesting paper.
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